Periodic attractor in the discrete time best-response dynamics of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game

Jos\'e Pedro Gaiv\~ao and Telmo Peixe

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game is a classic non-cooperative game widely studied in terms of its theoretical analysis as well as in its applications, ranging from sociology and biology to economics. Many experimental results of the RPS game indicate that this game is better modelled by the discretized best-response dynamics rather than continuous time dynamics. In this work we show that the attractor of the discrete time best-response dynamics of the RPS game is finite and periodic. Moreover we also describe the bifurcations of the attractor and determine the exact number, period and location of the periodic strategies.

Date: 2019-12
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Published in Dynamic Games and Applications, published online, November 2020

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1912.06831

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