How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups

Erel Segal-Halevi and Warut Suksompong

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious. We generalize this result by showing that it is possible to partition the players into groups of any desired sizes and divide the cake among the groups, so that each group receives a single contiguous piece and no player finds the piece of another group better than that of the player's own group.

Date: 2020-01, Revised 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in American Mathematical Monthly, 128(1):79-83 (2021)

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