Macroeconomic Instability And Fiscal Decentralization: An Empirical Analysis
Ahmad Zafarullah Abdul Jalil,
Mukaramah Harun and
Siti Hadijah Che Mat
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
The main objective of this paper is to fill a critical gap in the literature by analyzing the effects of decentralization on the macroeconomic stability. A survey of the voluminous literature on decentralization suggests that the question of the links between decentralization and macroeconomic stability has been relatively scantily analyzed. Even though there is still a lot of room for analysis as far as the effects of decentralization on other aspects of the economy are concerned, we believe that it is in this area that a more thorough analyses are mostly called for. Through this paper, we will try to shed more light on the issue notably by looking at other dimension of macroeconomic stability than the ones usually employed in previous studies as well as by examining other factors that might accentuate or diminish the effects of decentralization on macroeconomic stability. Our results found that decentralization appears to lead to a decrease in inflation rate. However, we do not find any correlation between decentralization with the level of fiscal deficit. Our results also show that the impact of decentralization on inflation is conditional on the level of perceived corruption and political institutions.
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Published in PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS 2012
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.03486 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2001.03486
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().