Complexity, Stability Properties of Mixed Games and Dynamic Algorithms, and Learning in the Sharing Economy

Michael C. Nwogugu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The Sharing Economy (which includes Airbnb, Apple, Alibaba, Uber, WeWork, Ebay, Didi Chuxing, Amazon) blossomed across the world, triggered structural changes in industries and significantly affected international capital flows primarily by disobeying a wide variety of statutes and laws in many countries. They also illegally reduced and changing the nature of competition in many industries often to the detriment of social welfare. This article develops new dynamic pricing models for the SEOs and derives some stability properties of mixed games and dynamic algorithms which eliminate antitrust liability and also reduce deadweight losses, greed, Regret and GPS manipulation. The new dynamic pricing models contravene the Myerson Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem.

Date: 2020-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2001.08192

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