Agenda-manipulation in ranking

Gregorio Curello and Ludvig Sinander

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on -- agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this 'regret-freeness' property are characterised by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritise among alternatives; insertion sort prioritises lexicographically.

Date: 2020-01, Revised 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Published in Review of Economic Studies (2023), 90(4), 1865-1892

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2001.11341

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