A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget

Rodrigo A. Velez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents' well documented financial constraints. To resolve this issue we consider piece-wise linear budget constrained preferences. These preferences admit differences in agents' marginal disutility of paying rent below and above a given reference, i.e., a soft budget. We construct a polynomial algorithm to calculate a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, and other related solutions, in this domain.

Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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