Sharing of longevity basis risk in pension schemes with income-drawdown guarantees
Ankush Agarwal,
Christian-Oliver Ewald and
Yongjie Wang
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
This work studies a stochastic optimal control problem for a pension scheme which provides an income-drawdown policy to its members after their retirement. To manage the scheme efficiently, the manager and members agree to share the investment risk based on a pre-decided risk-sharing rule. The objective is to maximise both sides' utilities by controlling the manager's investment in risky assets and members' benefit withdrawals. We use stochastic affine class models to describe the force of mortality of the members' population and consider a longevity bond whose coupon payment is linked to a survival index. In our framework, we also investigate the longevity basis risk, which arises when the members' and the longevity bond's reference populations show different mortality behaviours. By applying the dynamic programming principle to solve the corresponding HJB equations, we derive optimal solutions for the single- and sub-population cases. Our numerical results show that by sharing the risk, both manager and members increase their utility. Moreover, even in the presence of longevity basis risk, we demonstrate that the longevity bond acts as an effective hedging instrument.
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-rmg and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.05232 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Sharing of longevity basis risk in pension schemes with income-drawdown guarantees (2020) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2002.05232
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