The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference

Achille Basile (), Surekha Rao () and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
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K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao: Indiana University Northwest

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Abstract: We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.

Date: 2020-02, Revised 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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