Equilibrium Model of Limit Order Books: A Mean-field Game View

Jin Ma and Eunjung Noh

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Abstract: In this paper we study a continuous time equilibrium model of limit order book (LOB) in which the liquidity dynamics follows a non-local, reflected mean-field stochastic differential equation (SDE) with evolving intensity. Generalizing the basic idea of Ma et al. (2015), we argue that the frontier of the LOB (e.g., the best asking price) is the value function of a mean-field stochastic control problem, as the limiting version of a Bertrand-type competition among the liquidity providers. With a detailed analysis on the $N$-seller static Bertrand game, we formulate a continuous time limiting mean-field control problem of the representative seller. We then validate the dynamic programming principle (DPP), and show that the value function is a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We argue that the value function can be used to obtain the equilibrium density function of the LOB, following the idea of Ma et al. (2015).

Date: 2020-02, Revised 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mst and nep-ore
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