A Note on Solving Discretely-Constrained Nash-Cournot Games via Complementarity

Dimitri J. Papageorgiou, Francisco Trespalacios and Stuart Harwood

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Abstract: Discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games have attracted attention as they arise in various competitive energy production settings in which players must make one or more discrete decisions. Gabriel et al. ["Solving discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot games with an application to power markets." Networks and Spatial Economics 13(3), 2013] claim that the set of equilibria to a discretely-constrained Nash-Cournot game coincides with the set of solutions to a corresponding discretely-constrained mixed complementarity problem. We show that this claim is false.

Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in Networks and Spatial Economics 21 (2), 2021

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