Equity-Based Incentives, Production/Service Functions And Game Theory

Michael C. Nwogugu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: EBIs/ESOs substantially change the traditional production/service function because ESOs/EBIs can have different psychological effects(motivation or de-motivation), and can create intangible capital and different economic payoffs. Although Game Theory is flawed, it can be helpful in describing interactions in ESO/EBIs transactions. ESOs/EBIs involve two-stage games and there are no perfect Nash Equilibria for the two sub-games. The large number of actual and potential participants in these games significantly complicates resolution of equilibria and increases the dynamism of the games given that players are more sensitive to other peoples moves in such games. This article: a) analyzes how ESOs/EBIs affect traditional assumptions of production functions (in both the manufacturing and service sectors), b) analyzes ESOs/EBIs transactions using game theory concepts, c) illustrates some of the limitations of game theory.

Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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