Conflict externalization and the quest for peace: theory and case evidence from Colombia

Hector Galindo-Silva

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I study the relationship between the likelihood of a violent domestic conflict and the risk that such a conflict "externalizes" (i.e. spreads to another country by creating an international dispute). I consider a situation in which a domestic conflict between a government and a rebel group has the potential to externalize. I show that the risk of externalization increases the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, but only if the government is sufficiently powerful relative to the rebels, the risk of externalization is sufficiently high, and the foreign actor who can intervene in the domestic conflict is sufficiently uninterested in material costs and benefits. I show how this model helps to understand the recent and successful peace process between the Colombian government and the country's most powerful rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Date: 2020-03, Revised 2020-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Peace Econ. Peace Sci. Pub. Pol. 2021; 27(1): 29-50

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.02990 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Conflict Externalization and the Quest for Peace: Theory and Case Evidence from Colombia (2021)
Journal Article: Conflict externalization and the quest for peace: theory and case evidence from Colombia (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2003.02990

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().