Electoral systems and international trade policy

Serkan Kucuksenel and Osman Gulseven

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral sys tems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or foreign lobby changes a government's final decision on trade policy, and trade policy in countries with proportional electoral system is more protectionist than in countries with majoritarian electoral system. Moreover, lobbies pay more to affect the trade policy outcomes in countries with proportional representation systems.

Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-int and nep-pol
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Published in Actual Problems of Economics, 7(121), pages 366-371 (2011)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2003.05725

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