Exact capacitated domination: on the computational complexity of uniqueness

Gregory Gutin, Philip R Neary and Anders Yeo

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Abstract: In this paper we consider a local service-requirement assignment problem named exact capacitated domination from an algorithmic point of view. This problem aims to find a solution (a Nash equilibrium) to a game-theoretic model of public good provision. In the problem we are given a capacitated graph, a graph with a parameter defined on each vertex that is interpreted as the capacity of that vertex. The objective is to find a DP-Nash subgraph: a spanning bipartite subgraph with partite sets D and P, called the D-set and P-set respectively, such that no vertex in P is isolated and that each vertex in D is adjacent to a number of vertices equal to its capacity. We show that whether a capacitated graph has a unique DP-Nash subgraph can be decided in polynomial time. However, we also show that the nearby problem of deciding whether a capacitated graph has a unique D-set is co-NP-complete.

Date: 2020-03, Revised 2022-07
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