EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Egalitarian solution for games with discrete side payment

Takafumi Otsuka

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, we study the egalitarian solution for games with discrete side payment, where the characteristic function is integer-valued and payoffs of players are integral vectors. The egalitarian solution, introduced by Dutta and Ray in 1989, is a solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games in characteristic form, which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of indivisual interests in a consistent manner. We first point out that the nice properties of the egalitarian solution (in the continuous case) do not extend to games with discrete side payment. Then we show that the Lorenz stable set, which may be regarded a variant of the egalitarian solution, has nice properties such as the Davis and Maschler reduced game property and the converse reduced game property. For the proofs we utilize recent results in discrete convex analysis on decreasing minimization on an M-convex set investigated by Frank and Murota.

Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.10059 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2003.10059

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2023-06-01
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2003.10059