What Matters to Individual Investors: Price Setting in Online Auctions of P2P Consumer Loans

Andreas Dietrich and Reto Rey

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze how retail investors price the credit risk of online P"P consumer loans in a reverse auction framework where personal interaction is absent. The explained interest rate variance is considerably larger than in comparable studies using bank loan data. This is unexpected, given the difference in experience and the limited set of information provided to the investor. Factors representing economic status significantly influence lender evaluations of the borrower's credit risk. Previous studies on gender discrimination found mixed results. We show that this is likely due to simplified specifications and find surprising results: male borrowers are charged a higher interest rates, conditional on being married and having children. Overall, our results indicate that retail investors exhibit a strong degree of predictability in this weakly regulated market for online P2P consumer loans.

Date: 2020-03, Revised 2022-12
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