The Moral Burden of Ambiguity Aversion

Brian Jabarian

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In their article, "Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 46:3, 2018, Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve develop an original moral decision theory for cases under uncertainty, called "pluralist egalitarianism under uncertainty". In this paper, I firstly sketch their views and arguments. I then elaborate on their moral decision theory by discussing how it applies to choice scenarios in health ethics. Finally, I suggest a new two-stage Ellsberg thought experiment challenging the core of the principle of their theory. In such an experiment pluralist egalitarianism seems to suggest the wrong, morally and rationally speaking, course of action -- no matter whether I consider my thought experiment in a simultaneous or a sequential setting.

Date: 2020-04, Revised 2020-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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