Cores in discrete exchange economies with complex endowments

Jun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The core is a traditional and useful solution concept in economic theory. But in discrete exchange economies without transfers, when endowments are complex, the core may be empty. This motivates Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019) to interpret endowments as exclusion rights and propose a new concept called exclusion core. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a rectification of the core to solve its problem under complex endowments. Second, we propose a refinement of Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core to improve its performance. Our two core concepts share a common idea of correcting the misused altruism of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. We propose a mechanism to find allocations in the two cores.

Date: 2020-05, Revised 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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