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Reaping the Informational Surplus in Bayesian Persuasion

Ronen Gradwohl, Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer and Rann Smorodinsky

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Abstract: The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we study a setting with multiple senders, but in which the receiver interacts with only one sender of his choice: senders commit to signals and the receiver then chooses, at the interim stage, with which sender to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are even slightly uncertain about each other's preferences, the receiver receives all the informational surplus in all equilibria of this game.

Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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