Coordinated Transaction Scheduling in Multi-Area Electricity Markets: Equilibrium and Learning

Mariola Ndrio, Subhonmesh Bose, Lang Tong and Ye Guo

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Tie-line scheduling in multi-area power systems in the US largely proceeds through a market-based mechanism called Coordinated Transaction Scheduling (CTS). We analyze this market mechanism through a game-theoretic lens. Our analysis characterizes the effect of market liquidity, market participants' forecasts about inter-area price spreads, transactions fees and coupling of CTS markets with up-to-congestion virtual transactions. Using real data, we empirically verify that CTS bidders can employ simple learning algorithms to discover Nash equilibria that support the conclusions drawn from equilibrium analysis.

Date: 2020-06, Revised 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-gth
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