Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in a Realistic Limit Order Book Market Simulation
Micha\"el Karpe,
Jin Fang,
Zhongyao Ma and
Chen Wang
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
Optimal order execution is widely studied by industry practitioners and academic researchers because it determines the profitability of investment decisions and high-level trading strategies, particularly those involving large volumes of orders. However, complex and unknown market dynamics pose significant challenges for the development and validation of optimal execution strategies. In this paper, we propose a model-free approach by training Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents in a realistic market simulation environment with multiple agents. First, we configure a multi-agent historical order book simulation environment for execution tasks built on an Agent-Based Interactive Discrete Event Simulation (ABIDES) [arXiv:1904.12066]. Second, we formulate the problem of optimal execution in an RL setting where an intelligent agent can make order execution and placement decisions based on market microstructure trading signals in High Frequency Trading (HFT). Third, we develop and train an RL execution agent using the Double Deep Q-Learning (DDQL) algorithm in the ABIDES environment. In some scenarios, our RL agent converges towards a Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) strategy. Finally, we evaluate the simulation with our RL agent by comparing it with a market replay simulation using real market Limit Order Book (LOB) data.
Date: 2020-06, Revised 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mst
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2006.05574
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