Nash SIR: An Economic-Epidemiological Model of Strategic Behavior During a Viral Epidemic

David McAdams

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper develops a Nash-equilibrium extension of the classic SIR model of infectious-disease epidemiology ("Nash SIR"), endogenizing people's decisions whether to engage in economic activity during a viral epidemic and allowing for complementarity in social-economic activity. An equilibrium epidemic is one in which Nash equilibrium behavior during the epidemic generates the epidemic. There may be multiple equilibrium epidemics, in which case the epidemic trajectory can be shaped through the coordination of expectations, in addition to other sorts of interventions such as stay-at-home orders and accelerated vaccine development. An algorithm is provided to compute all equilibrium epidemics.

Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hea and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published in Covid Economics (working paper series), issue 16, 115-134, 2020

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2006.10109

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