Mechanism of Instrumental Game Theory in The Legal Process via Stochastic Options Pricing Induction

Kwadwo Osei Bonsu and Shoucan Chen

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Abstract: Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in a legal dispute to exchange information through a process called discovery. The purpose is to reduce the relative optimisms developed by asymmetric information between the parties. Like a head or tail phenomenon in stochastic processes, uncertainty in the adjudication affects the decisions of the parties in a legal negotiation. This paper therefore applies the principles of aleatory analysis to determine how negotiations fail in the legal process, introduce the axiological concept of optimal transaction cost and formulates a numerical methodology based on backwards induction and stochastic options pricing economics in estimating the reasonable and fair bargain in order to induce settlements thereby increasing efficiency and reducing social costs.

Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-law and nep-ore
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