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Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice

Achille Basile (), Surekha Rao () and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao

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Abstract: Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indifference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice functions on V . The number of such functions is $2^{n+1}$ if V contains $n$ agents.

Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice (2022) Downloads
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