Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool

Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk and Rolf Niedermeier

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Abstract: We introduce the model of line-up elections which captures parallel or sequential single-winner elections with a shared candidate pool. The goal of a line-up election is to find a high-quality assignment of a set of candidates to a set of positions such that each position is filled by exactly one candidate and each candidate fills at most one position. A score for each candidate-position pair is given as part of the input, which expresses the qualification of the candidate to fill the position. We propose several voting rules for line-up elections and analyze them from an axiomatic and an empirical perspective using real-world data from the popular video game FIFA.

Date: 2020-07
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