Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games

Dilip Ravindran and Zhihan Cui

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders who have access to conditionally independent experiments (and possibly others). Senders have zero-sum preferences over information revealed. We characterize when any set of states can be pooled in equilibrium and when all equilibria are fully revealing. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender utility functions are `globally nonlinear'. With two states, this is equivalent to some sender having nontrivial preferences. The upshot is that `most' zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation. We explore what conditions are important for competition to result in such stark information revelation.

Date: 2020-08, Revised 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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