Search for a moving target in a competitive environment

Benoit Duvocelle, J\'anos Flesch, Hui Min Shi and Dries Vermeulen

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Abstract: We consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.

Date: 2020-08, Revised 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Search for a moving target in a competitive environment (2021)
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