Contingent Convertible Bonds in Financial Networks
Carlo Sala and
Papers from arXiv.org
We study the role of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) in a network of interconnected banks. We first confirm the phase transitions documented by Acemoglu et al. (2015) in absence of CoCos, thus revealing that the structure of the interbank network is of fundamental importance for the effectiveness of CoCos as a financial stability enhancing mechanism. Furthermore, we show that in the presence of a moderate financial shock lightly interconnected financial networks are more robust than highly interconnected networks, and can possibly be the optimal choice for both CoCos issuers and buyers. Finally our results show that, under some network structures, the presence of CoCos can increase (and not reduce) financial fragility, because of the occurring of unneeded triggers and consequential suboptimal conversions that damage CoCos investors.
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