Fairness principles for insurance contracts in the presence of default risk

Delia Coculescu and Freddy Delbaen

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions.

Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ias and nep-rmg
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