Strategy-proof allocation with outside option

Jun Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for several existing results in distinct models and imply new results in some models. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategy-proof mechanisms, pinning down every agent's probability of choosing his outside option is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result provides a sufficient condition for two strategy-proof mechanisms to be equivalent when the number of possible allocations is finite.

Date: 2020-09, Revised 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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