To Act or not to Act? Political competition in the presence of a threat

Arthur Fishman and Doron Klunover

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present a model of political competition in which an incumbent politician, may implement a costly policy to prevent a possible threat to, for example, national security or a natural disaster.

Date: 2020-10, Revised 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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