On the profitability of selfish blockchain mining under consideration of ruin

Hansjoerg Albrecher and Pierre-Olivier Goffard

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Abstract: Mining blocks on a blockchain equipped with a proof of work consensus protocol is well-known to be resource-consuming. A miner bears the operational cost, mainly electricity consumption and IT gear, of mining, and is compensated by a capital gain when a block is discovered. This paper aims at quantifying the profitability of mining when the possible event of ruin is also considered. This is done by formulating a tractable stochastic model and using tools from applied probability and analysis, including the explicit solution of a certain type of advanced functional differential equation. The expected profit at a future time point is determined for the situation when the miner follows the protocol as well as when he/she withholds blocks. The obtained explicit expressions allow to analyze the sensitivity with respect to the different model ingredients and to identify conditions under which selfish mining is a strategic advantage.

Date: 2020-10
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