When "Better" is better than "Best"

Ben Amiet, Andrea Collevecchio and Kais Hamza

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the better-response dynamics converge to pure Nash equilibrium whenever there is one, whereas best-response dynamics fails to converge, as it is trapped.

Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2011.00239

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