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Duality for optimal consumption with randomly terminating income

Ashley Davey, Michael Monoyios and Harry Zheng

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We establish a rigorous duality theory, under No Unbounded Profit with Bounded Risk, for an infinite horizon problem of optimal consumption in the presence of an income stream that can terminate randomly at an exponentially distributed time, independent of the asset prices. We thus close a duality gap encountered by Vellekoop and Davis in a version of this problem in a Black-Scholes market. Many of the classical tenets of duality theory hold, with the notable exception that marginal utility at zero initial wealth is finite. We use as dual variables a class of supermartingale deflators such that deflated wealth plus cumulative deflated consumption in excess of income is a supermartingale. We show that the space of discounted local martingale deflators is dense in our dual domain, so that the dual problem can also be expressed as an infimum over the discounted local martingale deflators. We characterise the optimal wealth process, showing that optimal deflated wealth is a potential decaying to zero, while deflated wealth plus cumulative deflated consumption over income is a uniformly integrable martingale at the optimum. We apply the analysis to the Vellekoop and Davis example and give a numerical solution.

Date: 2020-10, Revised 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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