Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games

Manuel Staab

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about relative consumption becomes available, this cannot be ignored. Despite concavity in the objective function, stable types must be willing to accept risky gambles to differentiate themselves, and thus allow for coordination. Relative consumption acts as a form of costly communication. This suggests status preferences to be salient in settings where miscoordination is particularly costly.

Date: 2020-11, Revised 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-coordination Games (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2011.02740

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