Saturating stable matchings

Muhammad Maaz

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my analysis to perfect stable matchings, where every agent on both sides is matched.

Date: 2020-11, Revised 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Published in Operations Research Letters 2021;49(4):597-601

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