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A Reputation for Honesty

Drew Fudenberg, Ying Gao and Harry Pei

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Abstract: We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an idiosyncratic shock, and before players act. The patient player is either an honest type whose action coincides with their announcement, or an opportunistic type who can freely choose their actions. We show that the patient player can secure a high payoff by building a reputation for being honest when the short-run players face uncertainty about which of the patient player's actions are currently feasible, but may receive a low payoff when there is no such uncertainty.

Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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