Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof

Clayton Thomas

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the strategic simplicity of stable matching mechanisms where one side has fixed preferences, termed priorities. Specifically, we ask which priorities are such that the strategyproofness of deferred acceptance (DA) can be recognized by agents unable to perform contingency reasoning, that is, \emph{when is DA obviously strategyproof} (Li, 2017)? We answer this question by completely characterizing those priorities which make DA obviously strategyproof (OSP). This solves an open problem of Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018. We find that when DA is OSP, priorities are either acyclic (Ergin, 2002), a restrictive condition which allows priorities to only differ on only two agents at a time, or contain an extremely limited cyclic pattern where all priority lists are identical except for exactly two. We conclude that, for stable matching mechanisms, the tension between understandability (in the sense of OSP) and expressiveness of priorities is very high.

Date: 2020-11, Revised 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-evo
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