Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner's dilemma

Tim Johnson and Oleg Smirnov

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a spatial, one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism's behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its choice of when to implement that strategy across a set of discrete time slots. Cooperators evolve to fixation regularly in the model when we add time slots to lattices and small-world networks, and their portion of the population grows, albeit slowly, when organisms interact in a scale-free network. This selection for cooperators occurs across a wide variety of time slots and it does so even when a crucial condition for the evolution of cooperation on graphs is violated--namely, when the ratio of benefits to costs in the PD does not exceed the number of spatially-adjacent organisms.

Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2011.14440 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2011.14440

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().