Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559

Tim Roughgarden

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a burned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the game-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some alternative designs.

Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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