Information Leakage Games: Exploring Information as a Utility Function

M\'ario S. Alvim, Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Yusuke Kawamoto and Catuscia Palamidessi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: A common goal in the areas of secure information flow and privacy is to build effective defenses against unwanted leakage of information. To this end, one must be able to reason about potential attacks and their interplay with possible defenses. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to formalize strategies of attacker and defender in the context of information leakage, and provide a basis for developing optimal defense methods. A novelty of our games is that their utility is given by information leakage, which in some cases may behave in a non-linear way. This causes a significant deviation from classic game theory, in which utility functions are linear with respect to players' strategies. Hence, a key contribution of this paper is the establishment of the foundations of information leakage games. We consider two kinds of games, depending on the notion of leakage considered. The first kind, the QIF-games, is tailored for the theory of quantitative information flow (QIF). The second one, the DP-games, corresponds to differential privacy (DP).

Date: 2020-12, Revised 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in ACM Trans. Priv. Secur. 25, 3, Article 20 (August 2022), pp. 1-36

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.12060 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2012.12060

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().