Social distancing in networks: A web-based interactive experiment

Edoardo Gallo, Darija Barak and Alastair Langtry

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Governments have used social distancing to stem the spread of COVID-19, but lack evidence on the most effective policy to ensure compliance. We examine the effectiveness of fines and informational messages (nudges) in promoting social distancing in a web-based interactive experiment conducted during the first wave of the pandemic on a near-representative sample of the US population. Fines promote distancing, but nudges only have a marginal impact. Individuals do more social distancing when they are aware they are a superspreader. Using an instrumental variable approach, we argue progressives are more likely to practice distancing, and they are marginally more responsive to fines.

Date: 2020-12, Revised 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2012.12118

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