Negative votes to depolarize politics

Karthik H. Shankar

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The controversies around the 2020 US presidential elections certainly casts serious concerns on the efficiency of the current voting system in representing the people's will. Is the naive Plurality voting suitable in an extremely polarized political environment? Alternate voting schemes are gradually gaining public support, wherein the voters rank their choices instead of just voting for their first preference. However they do not capture certain crucial aspects of voter preferences like disapprovals and negativities against candidates. I argue that these unexpressed negativities are the predominant source of polarization in politics. I propose a voting scheme with an explicit expression of these negative preferences, so that we can simultaneously decipher the popularity as well as the polarity of each candidate. The winner is picked by an optimal tradeoff between the most popular and the least polarizing candidate. By penalizing the candidates for their polarization, we can discourage the divisive campaign rhetorics and pave way for potential third party candidates.

Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Published in Group Decision and Negotiation (2022), Vol 31, Pages 1097--1120

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2012.13657

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