Bus operators in competition: a directed location approach

Fernanda Herrera and Sergio I. L\'opez

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present a directed variant of Salop (1979) model to analyze bus transport dynamics. The players are operators competing in cooperative and non-cooperative games. Utility, like in most bus concession schemes in emerging countries, is proportional to the total fare collection. Competition for picking up passengers leads to well documented and dangerous driving practices that cause road accidents, traffic congestion and pollution. We obtain theoretical results that support the existence and implementation of such practices, and give a qualitative description of how they come to occur. In addition, our results allow to compare the current or base transport system with a more cooperative one.

Date: 2021-01, Revised 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-tre
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