A Contextualist Decision Theory

Saleh Afroogh

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Decision theorists propose a normative theory of rational choice. Traditionally, they assume that they should provide some constant and invariant principles as criteria for rational decisions, and indirectly, for agents. They seek a decision theory that invaribably works for all agents all the time. They believe that a rational agent should follow a certain principle, perhaps the principle of maximizing expected utility everywhere, all the time. As a result of the given context, these principles are considered, in this sense, context-independent. Furthermore, decision theorists usually assume that the relevant agents at work are ideal agents, and they believe that non-ideal agents should follow them so that their decisions qualify as rational. These principles are universal rules. I will refer to this context-independent and universal approach in traditional decision theory as Invariantism. This approach is, implicitly or explicitly, adopted by theories which are proposed on the basis of these two assumptions.

Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-ias and nep-upt
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