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Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

Haris Aziz, Anton Baychkov and Peter Biro

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of Kamada and Kojima on matchings with distributional constraints. We study three solution concepts, the strong and weak stability concepts proposed by Kamada and Kojima, and a new one in between the two, called cutoff stability. Kamada and Kojima showed that a strongly stable matching may not exist in their most restricted model with disjoint regional quotas. Our first result is that checking its existence is NP-hard. We then show that a cutoff stable matching exists not just for the summer internship problem but also for the general matching model with arbitrary heredity constraints. We present an algorithm to compute a cutoff stable matching and show that it runs in polynomial time in our special case of summer internship model. However, we also show that finding a maximum size cutoff stable matching is NP-hard, but we provide a Mixed Integer Linear Program formulation for this optimisation problem.

Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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