Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment
Martino Banchio and
Papers from arXiv.org
A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far, but cannot commit to future prices. We show that, regardless of the degree of persistence, any equilibrium under a D1-style refinement gives the seller revenue no higher than what she would get from posting all prices in advance.
Date: 2021-02, Revised 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2102.07742
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