Static Pricing in Dynamic Sales
Martino Banchio and
Papers from arXiv.org
A monopolist sells items repeatedly over time to a consumer with persistent private information. The seller has limited commitment: she cannot commit to a long-term contract but always has the option to commit to posted prices for unsold items. We show that a static price path is the unique equilibrium outcome; that is, the seller cannot do better than simply posting the monopoly price for each item. The ratchet effect eliminates price discrimination gains for any degree of persistence of the private information. The paper also shows how dynamic mechanism design can help derive new results in games with limited commitment.
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