Affirmative Action vs. Affirmative Information

Claire Lazar Reich

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Critical decisions in hiring, college admissions, and credit lending are guided by predictions made in the presence of uncertainty. While uncertainty imparts errors across all demographic groups, this paper shows that the types of errors vary systematically: Groups with higher average outcomes are typically assigned higher false positive rates, while those with lower average outcomes are assigned higher false negative rates. We characterize the conditions that give rise to this disparate impact and explain why the intuitive remedy to omit demographic variables from datasets does not correct it. Instead of data omission, this paper examines how data acquisition can broaden access to opportunity. The strategy, which we call "Affirmative Information," could stand as an alternative to Affirmative Action.

Date: 2021-02, Revised 2024-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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