Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments

Gaurab Aryal (), Manudeep Bhuller and Fabian Lange

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper considers the use of instruments to identify and estimate private and social returns to education within a model of employer learning. What an instrument identifies depends on whether it is hidden from, or transparent (i.e., observed) to, the employers. A hidden instrument identifies private returns to education, and a transparent instrument identifies social returns to education. We use variation in compulsory schooling laws across non-central and central municipalities in Norway to, respectively, construct hidden and transparent instruments. We estimate a private return of 7.9%, of which 70% is due to increased productivity and the remaining 30% is due to signaling.

Date: 2021-03, Revised 2021-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.04123 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments (2022)
Working Paper: Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments (2020)
Working Paper: Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments (2020)
Working Paper: Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2103.04123

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().