On the Approximate Purification of Mixed Strategies in Games with Infinite Action Sets

Yuhki Hosoya and Chaowen Yu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, and show that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has an approximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this result can be further weakened if we consider the purification of a Nash equilibrium. Combined with the existence theorem for a Nash equilibrium, we derive an existence theorem for a pure strategy approximated Nash equilibrium under sufficiently weak assumptions. All of the pure strategies we derive in this paper can take a finite number of possible actions.

Date: 2021-03, Revised 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in Economic Theory Bulletin 10, 69-93 (2022)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2103.07736

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